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Abstract
This paper analyzes oligopolistic rivalry among source countries to evaluate the degree of
exchange−rate pass−through. The analysis of Japanese imports of DRAMs also contributes to
the study of the pass−through of relatively homogenous goods produced in emerging
countries, which has been analyzed in very few papers. Comparison between traditional OLS
estimates, which take competitors' pricing behavior as exogenously given, and GMM
estimates, which fully endogenize the rivals' pricing behavior, indicates the misspecification
in the OLS estimates and the need to endogenize pricing behavior. The results also show that
the degree of pass−through estimated by GMM is lower than that estimated by OLS, and that
prices are strategic complements between the following pairs of countries; Korea and
Taiwan, Taiwan and Singapore, and Singapore and the US.
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The purpose of this paper is to investigate how the strategic behavior of producers
aﬀects exchange rate pass-through in the presence of oligopolistic competition. In
a seminal paper on the relationship between exchange rate ﬂuctuations and goods
prices, Dornbusch (1987) presents a model to show that oligopolistic ﬁrms set
prices that do not fully reﬂect exchange rate ﬂuctuations, by taking competing
ﬁrms’ behavior into account. There are several empirical papers in the pass-
through literature that examine the eﬀect of rivalry on pass-through. However
most of these papers use single-equation estimation methods and do not include
analysis of pricing interactions among rivals.1
Recently, Gross and Schmitt (2000) have analyzed the relationship between
exchange rate pass-through and strategic pricing in an oligopolistic market by
u s i n g3 S L St oe x a m i n et h eS w i s sa u t o m o bile market. Their results show that
the degree of pass-through is relatively low compared to other studies, which do
not endogenize rivals’ pricing behavior. Our research is based on the results
of Gross and Schmitt’s ﬁndings, but more explicitly compares traditional OLS
estimates, which take competitors’ pricing behavior as exogenously given, and
GMM estimates which fully endogenize the rivals’ pricing behavior. Our results
indicate the misspeciﬁcation in the OLS estimates and the need to endogenize
pricing behavior.
Another aim of this paper is to investigate exchange rate pass-through of ho-
mogenous goods in emerging countries, which has been analyzed in very few pa-
pers.2 These studies show that the estimated degree of pass-through is lower than
that of advanced countries. This is because emerging countries have very little
control over the price at which they sell their commodities and therefore exchange
1For example, Feenstra (1989) uses the competing price of imports to control for domestic
competition in his study of Japanese automobile exports to the US. Feenstra, Gagnon, and
Knetter (1996) construct aggregate prices for competitors to control for substitute products.
However, these two studies do not analyze how prices in a market interact following an exchange
rate shock. Studies on the pricing of producers from emerging countries, which are shown in
Table 1, also take exchange rates or prices of rivals as exogenously given.
2See Table 1 for example.
1rate changes may be of little relevance in determining the price of these commodi-
ties.3 Unlike Gross and Schmitt, who investigate the automobile industry, in
which goods are horizontally-diﬀerentiated across producers, we examine dynamic
random access memories (DRAMs, thereafter), which are homogenous within a
generation but are diﬀerentiated between generations.4
Analysis of Japanese imports of DRAMs shows that two of four OLS esti-
mates, in which rivals’ prices are exogenously given, contain misspeciﬁcations,
while GMM estimates, which endogenize rivals’ prices, satisﬁes the overidentiﬁ-
cation test. These results indicate the need to endogenize rivals’ pricing behavior
for more accurate estimates of the degree of pass-through. The degree of pass-
through is lower in the GMM estimates than in the OLS estimates. That is, taking
price interdependence into account lowers the degree of pass-through in a compet-
itive oligopolistic market. Prices are strategic complements between the following
pairs of countries: Korea and Taiwan, Taiwan and Singapore, and Singapore and
the US.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents an oligopolistic
competition model in which two producers of DRAMs compete against each other
in the Japanese market. Section 3 describes the dataset and presents empirical
implementation. Finally, concluding remarks are provided in Section 4.
2T h e m o d e l
The goal of the empirical section of this paper is to investigate pass-through rela-
tionships in an oligopoly setting. Its aim is not to test a particular theory but to
estimate short-term degrees of exchange rate pass-through as well as price inter-
dependence among sellers. Hence we consider a duopoly situation in which rep-
resentative producers of DRAMs from diﬀerent source countries compete against
3For example, in his comments on Hooper and Mann (1989), Tobin observes that a country
such as Korea and Taiwan sells at a price over which it has very little control.
4DRAMs are classiﬁed into generation according to their storage capacity in terms of Binary
Information Units (bits). Technical progress in the industry is characterized by increases in a
chip’s memory capacity.
2each other in the Japanese market.
We assume that Company A produces DRAMs in Country A and Company B
in Country B. The proﬁts (πA) of Company A and the proﬁts (πB)o fC o m p a n y





















where PA denotes the price of Company A’s products in terms of the yen; PB
the price of Company B’s products in terms of yen; p = PA
PB t h er e l a t i v ep r i c eo f
the two companies’ products; eA the yen against Country A’s currency; eB the yen
against Country B’s currency; f (·) the demand function for Company A’s products
(f0(·) < 0); g(·) the demand function for Company B’s products (g0(·) < 0); cA the
unit cost of Company A in Country A’s currency; and cB the unit cost of Company
B in Country B’s currency.
Maximizing (1) with respect to PA and PB and rearranging, we can derive the
reaction function of Company A given the prices of Company B’s products PB,



























µA > 0 denotes the price elasticity of the markup of Company A’s
products, and ηB =
µB0
µBp > 0 denotes the price elasticity of the markup of Company
B’s products.
Equations (2) and (3) are reference equations for the empirical implementation
of the model. They show that the price of each company’s products depends on its
rival’s price, own marginal costs, and the exchange rate. A stronger yen [decrease
of eA(eB))] against Country A’s currency (Country B’s currency) reduces the cost
of imports in terms of the yen. Consequently, PA decreases, and so does PB,s i n c e
prices are strategic complements in a static Bertrand game. Likewise, a weaker yen
against Country A’s currency (Country B’s currency) [increase of eA(eB)], leads to
3an increase in both PA and PB.S i n c e 0 < 1
1+ηA < 1, 0 < 1
1+ηB < 1, the exchange
rate pass-through is incomplete for both countries.
3 Empirical analysis
3.1 Data
Our empirical analysis concentrates on the pricing behavior of DRAM producers
from several source countries in Japan from January 1997 to December 2001.5
The source countries under consideration are South Korea (K), Taiwan (T), Sin-
gapore (S), and the United States (A). According to Table 2, these countries
captured 76.4% to 94.5% of Japanese imports of DRAMs over the sample period.
Other source countries have been excluded from the investigation because they are
marginal exporters to the Japanese market, or because they expanded their market
s h a r eo n l yv e r yr e c e n t l y( e . g .C h i n a ) .
Table 3 summarizes the sources of the data used in the empirical analysis.
The variables are observed at monthly frequencies between 1997 and 2001. All
the variables are in logarithms and are seasonally unadjusted. The prices (Pj)a r e
measured as unit-values in terms of the yen. They are calculated by the value of
imports divided by the quantity of imports. The nominal exchange rates (Ej)a r e
deﬁned as the yen per the currency of the source country. The remaining variable
is the cost of production in the source countries (Cj), which is approximated by
the producer price index (PPI) of the related sector, except for Taiwan for which
the wholesale price index (WPI) is used.6
5Because the present HS Code table relevant to DRAMs was introduced in January 1997 -
the beginning of our sample - we use 60 sample data, which is relatively small.
6Several previous empirical studies use the unit labor cost and the price of raw materials as
proxies for the marginal cost of production. The measure we use is determined partly by data
availability and partly by our empirical approach.
In our data sets, neither unit-values of imports nor PPI reﬂect quality improvement. Using
these variables are consistent with the assumption that goods are vertically diﬀerentiated across
generations.
Among recent empirical studies on pass-through, or PTM, Takagi and Yoshida (2001), Feenstra,
Gagnon, and Knetter (1996), and Hung, Kim, and Ohno (1993) also use PPI as a proxy for the
marginal cost.
4In addition, we include three instrumental variables, which are to be used in
the GMM estimation. These variables are (1) currency crisis dummy (DUM), (2)
PPI of Japanese integrated circuits (ICs thereafter), and (3) capacity utilization
ratio of Japanese electric machineries (CAP). The currency crisis dummy is used
to control for drastic exchange rate ﬂuctuations during the East Asian crisis, and
takes 1 between July 1997 and December 1998, and 0 in the remaining period.
PPI of Japanese ICs and capacity utilization ratio of Japanese electric machineries
are chosen to control for prices of ICs produced by Japanese rival companies and
demand for DRAMs in Japanese market, respectively.
3.2 Estimation method
The main theoretical implication of the model in Section 2 is that rivalry may
lower exchange rate pass-through on price-setting in an oligopolistic market. The
goal of this empirical section is to investigate the role of rivalry on the degree of
exchange rate pass-through. Based on equations (2) and (3), the model to be
estimated is a set of best reply functions for producers from four source countries















j,k = K,T,S,A, and j 6= k
Before estimating equation (4), we need to impose model-relevant restrictions.
Each source country prices DRAMs according to its own cost, exchange rate and
competitors’ prices. Thus, we explicitly introduce the constraint that the coeﬃ-
cients on other countries’ costs and exchange rates are zero.7
7We test the non-stationarity of each of our data series using the Augmented Dickey-Fuller
(1979) procedure and the Phillips and Perron (1988) procedure. Based on the results of the tests
we decide that a system of simultaneous pricing consistent with equation (5) must be speciﬁed
in the ﬁrst diﬀerence, considering the possibility of small sample bias.
We then conduct cointegration tests among the four source-country price levels. The results
of the tests show that a hypothesis of no cointegrating vector cannot be rejected.
5We ﬁrst conduct OLS estimates, which regard rivals’ prices as exogenously
given. Then we regress four simultaneous-equations systems for the best reply
functions using GMM, and compare the results of the two estimates. We also
include the following instrumental variables for each test; exchange rates, costs,
prices of rival countries, Japanese PPI and capacity utilization ratio.
3.3 Results
In this section, we compare the estimation results in Table 4, which regard rivals’
prices as exogenously given, to those in Table 5, which endogenize rivals’ prices.
T h eR a m s e yt e s t si nT a b l e4r e j e c tt h en u l lh y p o t h e s i so fn om i s s p e c i ﬁcation at 5%
signiﬁcance level in two of the four estimates. In contrast, the results in Table 5
satisfy the overidentifying restrictions at 5% signiﬁcance level. These two results
indicate the need to endogenize rivals’ prices in the estimation.
Then we look at the short-term eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂuctuations on pro-
ducers’ own prices. The pass-through coeﬃcients are equal to coeﬃcients of the
parameter Ej. Table 5 shows that the pass-through coeﬃcient is positive at
1% signiﬁcance level in the case of Korea, which is the top-ranking producer of
DRAMs. For other countries the pass-through coeﬃcients are negative or in-
signiﬁcant. There are considered to be two reasons why only one country has
signiﬁcantly positive pass-through coeﬃcients. First, as discussed in Section 1,
because of the severe competition in the DRAM market, each producer has very
limited control of their prices. Second, since we use monthly data with no lags
in estimation, the exchange rate ﬂuctuations may not have been fully reﬂected in
prices in such a short time8. The estimated pass-through coeﬃcient of Korea in
Table 4 is 19.5%, while that in Table 5 is 6.4%. This result is consistent with
Gross and Schmitt, and shows that endogenizing price interdependence lowers the
8For comaprison, Gross and Schmitt’s estimated degrees of pass-through are 20-50%, which
are much higher than ours. The following two factors may explain this diﬀerence. One is that
Gross and Schmitt use quarterly data, which may magnify the eﬀects of exchange rate ﬂuctuations
on prices due to the longer period of time. The other is that they use automobile exports from
industrialized countries, which are highly diﬀerentiated. Thus each producer may exert more
power to control their prices and pass-through exchange rate ﬂuctuations.
6pass-through coeﬃcient.
The coeﬃcients on costs are signiﬁcantly positive in Taiwan and the USA, but is
signiﬁcantly negative in Korea in Table 5. The negative coeﬃcient for Korea may
result from the government subsidization to a DRAM producer (Hynix), which has
been strongly accused of the US Trade Representatives9.
There is the issue of short-term price rivalry among producers. The results
show that price-rivalry is source-country speciﬁc. Korea and Taiwan, Taiwan
and Singapore, and Singapore and the US, react positively to each other’s price
changes. In contrast, Taiwan and the US react negatively to each other’s price
changes. This result suggests that DRAMs produced by these two countries may
not compete against each other. One possible explanation is the complementarity
in production between the two countries. For instance, Taiwanese producers are
famous for their success in foundry services after the late 1990’s. The US fabless
ventures, which are engaged only in designing products, foundry-commissioned
manufactures with Taiwanese producers.
Finally, we provide the estimation results of 3SLS in Table 6 in order to show
the robustness of our results. The results in Table 6 satisfy the overidentifying
restrictions at 5% signiﬁcance level. The pass-through coeﬃcient of Korea is 5%,
almost the same as that estimated by GMM. There are also the same pattern of
price rivalry as in Table 5.
4 Concluding remarks
This paper analyzes the pass-through of Japanese imports of DRAMs from East
Asian countries. Comparing OLS estimates to GMM estimates, we show a mis-
speciﬁcation in the OLS estimates and the need to endogenize pricing behavior.
The results also show that the degree of pass-through estimated by GMM is lower
than that by OLS, and that prices are strategic complements among rival countries.
9Hynix is Korea’s second largest semiconductor manufacturer and in trouble during 2001-2002.
The USTR reports that aid to Hynix was provided in complex reﬁnancing agreements involving
debt rollovers, partial debt agreements, interest rate reductions, new lending and other forms of
assistance.
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9Table 1 
 
Previous Empirical Studies on the Exchange Rate Pass-Through of Eat Asian Countries 
 
 
Focus Authors  Countries    Data 
Rivalry Hung,  Kim,  and 
Ohno (1993) 
14 industrialized 
countries and 2 Asian 
NIEs (Korea and Taiwan)
Quarterly weighted-
average of export 
price data of wide 
range of commodities 
from 1970 to 1989 
 
Rivalry   Ito, Ogawa, and 
Sasaki (1998) 




vs. Japan and the USA 
Monthly aggeragate 
export and import 
price data of East 
Asian countries from 
1986-1996 
 
Not specified  Takagi and Yoshida 
(2001) 
East Asian countries 
(Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines, Singapore, 
Thailand), Germany, and 
the USA  
Monthly Japanese 
export and import 






and rivalry  
Lee (1995)  Korea  Quarterly Korean 
export price data of 
16 commodities from 





Athukorala (1991)  Korea  Quarterly Korean 












price data of four 
two-digit 
commodities from 
1978 to 1993 
 
101997 2001
Korea (K) 51.7 37.5
（weight、％）
Taiwan (T) 16.9 20.5
（weight、％）
Singapore (S) 14.1 8.3
（weight、％）
USA (A) 11.8 10.1
（weight、％）




Source: Trade statistics of Ministry of Finance.
Country
DRAM
Table 2: Structure of Japanese Imports of DRAMs
Sources
Nominal exchange rates (End of period)
  Yen / US$ Bank of Japan
Yen /Won Bank of Korea
Yen / S$ Statistics Singapore
Yen / NT$
Unit value of imports (Seasonally unadjusted)
DRAM HS854213021 Japan Customs
Producer price index (Seasonally unadjusted)
USA MOS Memory Devices -DRAM Bureau of Labor Statistics
Korea MOS Memory Bank of Korea
Taiwan (*) Semi Conductors National Statistics of Taiwan
Singapore Machinery and Transport Equipment Statistics Singapore
Japan Integrated circuits Bank of Japan
Capacity utilization ratio  (Seasonally unadjusted)
Japan Electrical Machinery Ministry of Economy, Trade and Industry
Note: Wholesale price index.
Data
National Statistics of Taiwan




Korea (j=K) Taiwan (j=T) Singapore (j=S) USA (j=A)
△P
K 1.402 -0.330 -0.168
(0.17) ** (0.14) * (0.22)
△P
T 0.434 0.292 -0.306
(0.05) ** (0.08) ** (0.12) *
△P
S -0.167 0.841 1.158
(0.12) (0.19) ** (0.12) **
△P
A -0.101 -0.372 0.534
(0.09) (0.15) * (0.06) **
△C
j -0.134 0.059 -0.156 0.132
(0.06) * (0.08) (0.06) * (0.07)
△E
j 0.195 -0.137 0.096 -0.068
(0.06) ** (0.08) (0.07) (0.07)
DUM 0.05 -0.12 0.07 -0.09
(0.11) (0.20) (0.12) (0.18)
Number of observations 58 58 58 58
Standard error of regression 0.47 0.86 0.53 0.77
Adjusted R-squared 0.82 0.76 0.77 0.81
Durbin-Watson 2.18 1.99 2.22 2.49
Ramsey's test 12.40 ** 1.29 3.52 5.42 *
Notes: 1 Standard errors in parenthesis.
2 * indicates significance at the 5% level .
** indicates significance at the 1% level .




Korea (j=K) Taiwan (j=T) Singapore (j=S) USA (j=A)
△P
K 1.304 -1.004 1.171
(0.05) ** (0.07) ** (0.14) **
△P
T 0.699 0.843 -1.095
(0.03) ** (0.02) ** (0.06) **
△P
S -0.661 1.087 1.400
(0.04) ** (0.03) ** (0.04) **
△P
A 0.390 -0.704 0.679
(0.04) ** (0.03) ** (0.02) **
△C
j -0.051 0.024 -0.004 0.034
(0.01) ** (0.01) ** (0.00) (0.01) **
△E
j 0.064 0.000 0.012 -0.016
(0.01) ** (0.00) (0.01) (0.01)
DUM 0.178 -0.307 0.260 -0.336
(0.08) * (0.12) * (0.11) * (0.15)
Number of observations 58 58 58 58
Standard error of regression 0.60 0.90 0.77 1.03
Adjusted R-squared 0.73 0.77 0.71 0.69
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.88 1.88 1.89
L.R. test for overidentifying restrictions   χ
2(28)＝39.8481 *
Notes: 1 Standard errors in parenthesis.
2 * indicates significance at the 5% level .
** indicates significance at the 1% level .




Korea (j=K) Taiwan (j=T) Singapore (j=S) USA (j=A)
△P
K 1.382 -1.026 1.027
(0.08) ** (0.10) ** (0.21) **
△P
T 0.653 0.833 -1.027
(0.04) ** (0.05) ** (0.12) **
△P
S -0.612 1.100 1.415
(0.07) ** (0.06) ** (0.09) **
△P
A 0.297 -0.631 0.637
(0.07) ** (0.07) ** (0.04) **
△C
j -0.037 0.018 -0.009 0.041
(0.02) (0.01) * (0.01) (0.02)
△E
j 0.050 -0.006 0.007 -0.014
(0.02) * (0.02) (0.01) (0.03)
DUM 0.095 -0.155 0.131 -0.168
(0.10) (0.16) (0.15) (0.21)
Number of observations 58 58 58 58
Standard error of regression 0.56 0.88 0.75 0.97
Adjusted R-squared 0.76 0.77 0.70 0.72
Durbin-Watson 1.88 1.87 1.87 1.91
Notes: 1 Standard errors in parenthesis.
2 * indicates significance at the 5% level .
** indicates significance at the 1% level .
Table 6: 3SLS Estimates
13